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Abstract
In an essay on anger, the ancient philosopher Se-
neca warns of the futility of harboring negati-
ve emotions given the imminence of death—the 
ultimate human equalizer. Ancient philosophers 
like Seneca believed that emotions are based on 
cognitions (beliefs) and are therefore modifi able 
through spiritual exercises. Modern research shows 
that the emotional and cognitive aspects of human 
psychology are malleable (nurture), but also require 
gene expression (nature). A parallel between indi-
vidual behavior and socio-political forces suggests 
a framework for the current environmental crisis—
another human equalizer. Two critical questions are 
suggested: Is the amassed experience of the last few 
centuries suffi cient to lead to corrective measures 
that would avoid environmental degradation? Or 
would a catastrophic event with signifi cant long-
term environmental degradation have to occur 
before corrective measures reach consensus at the 
socio-political level?
Key words: emotions, cognition, epigenesis, us-
versus-them view, environmental crisis.
Resumen
En un ensayo sobre la ira, el antiguo fi lósofo Séneca 
advierte lo inútil que es albergar emociones nega-
tivas, dada la inminencia de la muerte, condición 
que, en últimas, nos hace iguales como humanos. 
Los antiguos fi lósofos, creían que las emociones 
estaban basadas en cogniciones y que por eso eran 
modifi cables a través de ejercicios espirituales. 
Las investigaciones actuales demuestran que los 
aspectos cognitivos y emocionales de la psico-
logía humana son maleables (crianza), pero que 
también requieren expresión genética (naturaleza). 
Un paralelo entre el comportamiento individual y 
las fuerzas sociopolíticas sugiere un marco para la 
crisis ambiental actual, otro “ecualizador” huma-
no. Dos preguntas críticas surgen: ¿Es sufi ciente 
la experiencia acumulada de los dos últimos siglos 
para conseguir medidas correctivas que puedan 
impedir la degradación ambiental? o ¿es necesario 
que ocurra un evento catastrófi co de degradación 
ambiental signifi cativa a largo plazo para que las 
medidas correctivas puedan alcanzar consenso en 
el nivel socio-político?
Palabras clave: emociones, cognición, epi-
génesis, visión de nosotros-versus-ellos, crisis 
ambiental.
Seneca’s Plea
Seneca ended his essay On Anger with an expres-
sive plea on the ephemeral character of life and 
on the futility of harboring contempt for others. 
According to Seneca, angry men look like the bull 
and the bear, tied together at the arena, fi ghting 
with each other while the slayer patiently waits 
for the right moment. What, then, is the point of 
their anger? Similarly, human beings are tied by 
Rev Avances Psicologia_julio_28.indd   15 7/31/08   4:48:04 PM
?Mauricio R. Papini
 16?Avances en Psicología Latinoamericana/Bogotá (Colombia)/Vol. 26(1)/pp. 15-29/2008/ISSN1794-4724 
their mortality, which makes anger unnecessary 
and irrelevant. Would we not benefi t more from 
a peaceful attitude toward ourselves and others? 
Seneca (III, 43, 5):
Soon shall we spew forth this frail spirit. Meanwhile, 
so long as we draw breath, so long as we live among 
men, let us cherish humanity (colamus humanita-
tem). Let us not cause fear to any man, nor danger; let 
us scorn losses, wrongs, abuse, and taunts, and let us 
endure with heroic mind our short-lived ills. While 
we are looking back, as they say, and turning around, 
straightaway death will be upon us.
Seneca’s plea is powerful because it touches on 
some of the most basic aspects of human nature. 
First, the entire plea crumbles unless we assume 
that Seneca’s reader is capable of imagining death 
and, more precisely, his or her own death. What 
would be the point of this passage if it were directed 
at a being incapable of understanding, at some cog-
nitive level, that life has a discrete dimension—that 
it starts and ends at defi nite points in time? Perhaps 
African elephants are “thinking” about these very 
issues when they gather to touch the bones of their 
predecessors (Moss, 1988). Likewise, it seems 
possible that a young chimpanzee is grieving when 
it falls in a state of quiescence for many days after 
the death of his mother, showing signs strikingly 
similar to those of bereavement (Goodall, 1986). 
But are these just examples of grief, or do they also 
imply the cognitive capacity to think about death? 
Whereas we are uncertain about the extent to which 
the ability to think about death is uniquely human 
or shared with other species, there is no doubt that 
this cognitive or intellectual capacity is part of our 
mental experience and endowment. The concept 
of death may be seen as the pinnacle of what is a 
sophisticated cognitive capacity for representing 
the physical, social, and technological worlds in 
which humans live.
Despite the equalizing razor of death and the capacity 
to be aware of their own fi nitude, humans engage in 
seemingly irrational surges of feeling that domina-
te behavior, decisions, and daily experience. Such 
emotions and affective states seem irrational in the 
sense that they often lead to consequences that are 
against the person’s own interest and that they are 
immune to intentional control. Ancient philosophers, 
from Socrates to Seneca, may have held a different 
view, allowing for emotions to be based upon sets of 
beliefs (Hadot, 1995; Nussbaum, 1994). To Seneca, 
anger cannot be aroused without the “approval of the 
mind,” that is, without a person’s conscious belief that 
somebody has willfully made him or her the object of 
important and undeserved wrongdoing. Seneca (II, 1, 
5) summarizes his defi nition of anger by arguing that 
the mind has grasped something, has become indignant, 
has condemned the act, and now tries to avenge it.
But, is anger reducible to these beliefs? Or are 
the beliefs releasing anger? It would seem that the 
reductionist argument that turns emotions into a 
special case of cognitions like beliefs is like arguing 
that the entire event of a gunshot can be reduced to 
the gun’s triggering mechanism, without reference 
to the gunpowder and the bullet. Seneca himself 
would seem to be suggesting that the control or, 
even, eradication of anger (and all the emotions, 
by implication), can be achieved by educating the 
person about the factors that activate the triggering 
mechanism, so that the “irrational surges” never 
occur (see below). 
The second assumption behind Seneca’s ope-
ning plea is, then, that humans have an enormous 
capacity to experience emotions, some as extreme 
as anger, and to fall under their infl uence, rightly 
or not, in an almost ballistic manner. Indeed, folk 
psychology prints a picture according to which the 
self is at the mercy of its emotions: A person can 
experience emotions, but cannot hope to control 
them in any fundamental way. Even more, Western 
culture seems to be imbued by the notion that not 
only are emotions uncontrollable, but also attempts 
to repress them may lead to even worse conse-
quences, including mental disorder and physical 
pathology. 
Extending Seneca’s plea to build a more ge-
neral view, I suggest that it includes two major, 
irreducible capacities that characterize human ps-
ychology: the cognitive capacity to represent a vast 
variety of phenomena, including the person’s own 
death in the future, and the ability to be aroused by 
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emotions, affections, and feelings, including anger. 
The distinction between the cognitive and emo-
tional aspects of mental experience is supported 
by modern psychology. In contemporary learning 
theory, for example, a stimulus associated with 
an important event, such as food or pain, not only 
has cognitive value (i.e., it predicts the important 
event), but also acquires emotional value (i.e., it 
becomes important in its own right). The same 
stimulus can, therefore, activate both cognitive 
and emotional processes, each experimentally 
dissociable (Rescorla, 1980). Furthermore, the 
brain develops separate representations of these 
processes. Indeed, the mammalian brain seems 
to be especially equipped to learn both about the 
external world, or allocentric learning, and about 
the organism’s own emotional reaction to events 
in the environment, or egocentric learning (Papini, 
2003). For example (Bechara et al., 1995), human 
patients with lesions in the amygdala (located deep 
within the temporal lobe of the brain), can acquire 
knowledge about a simple association between a 
visual stimulus paired with a startling loud noise, 
but show no evidence of emotional arousal to the 
visual stimulus; vice versa, patients with hippo-
campal lesions (also located deep in the brain 
hemispheres) acquire the emotional arousal, but 
cannot describe the facts of such a training. 
However dissociable, cognitions and emotions 
are simultaneous in terms of subjective experien-
ce. Imagine that you have recently experienced a 
house burglary and, one night, you hear a sudden 
noise inside your house. The noise triggers two 
brain events that, while felt as a unitary phenome-
non, actually occur independently. One event is the 
cognition that something dangerous is impending, 
whereas the other is an emotional state of fear; 
both events originate in your previous experience 
of the robbery. Despite the unifi ed introspective 
experience that follows confrontation with an im-
portant event about which a person acquires both 
allocentric and egocentric information, the brain 
proceeds to analytically separate these two kinds 
of information into different streams of processing. 
On this basis, the distinction between cognition 
and emotion remains viable, despite their interde-
pendence.
There is a third and fi nal component in Seneca’s 
opening plea that he, as a Stoic, shared with other 
ancient philosophers (e.g., the Epicureans), and 
that relates to the interdependence just mentioned. 
If anger arises with “the approval of the mind,” 
if it is based on beliefs, then anything powerful 
enough to change a person’s belief should just as 
powerfully modify that person’s emotions, no mat-
ter how intense. And since beliefs are essentially 
forms of cognition, then it follows that emotions 
can be infl uenced with arguments, self-inspection, 
evaluation, and other forms of intellectual activity. 
Thus, just as one becomes angry if one believes 
to be somebody’s target of signifi cant and willful 
wrongdoing, anger would dissipate if one were per-
suaded that the damage was trivial or unintentional 
(Nussbaum, 1994). Similarly, the night fear promp-
ted by a sudden noise may recede immediately if 
the noise is believed to be caused by the falling of 
a framed picture, one that has fallen before and that 
poses no threat. 
The ancient conception that human emotions 
are based upon beliefs provides justifi cation for the 
claim that classic thinkers thought of philosophy 
as a “way of life,” a practice aiming at the “good 
life,” a life free from disturbance, serene, and 
emancipated from the oppression of anger, fear, 
frustration, greed, anxiety, hate, and other similarly 
degrading emotions. According to Hadot (1995), 
the philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome 
were fundamentally interested in developing and 
teaching a series of exercises designed to develop 
control over these aversive states of mind. Even 
the most fundamental worry, the fear of death, was 
conceptualized as being vulnerable to training, pro-
vided the disciple was willing to undergo radical 
changes in lifestyle through the practice of spiritual 
exercises. For the present purpose, the major point 
derived from ancient philosophy is that the funda-
mental properties of human nature, the cognitive 
and emotional capacities, are essentially malleable, 
modifi able, and subject to the force of experi-
ence. On this basis, I argue both that fundamental 
elements of human nature can be nurtured and that, 
as a consequence, nurture is actually required for 
human beings to become completely human in 
psychosocial terms. 
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Pliocene Park
Human capacities for cognition and emotion are 
inseparable from the shaping infl uence of experien-
ce. According to the view encapsulated in Seneca’s 
plea, nurture is an inseparable part of human nature. 
Then “colamus humanitatem” implies both cheris-
hing and cultivating humanity as well as learning 
to be human—human in the common sense of the 
word. The diversity of views on human nature is 
more that just the result of philosophical traditions 
in Western culture. Rather, it is the result of the 
malleability of higher cognitive and emotional 
capacities, as they infl uence individual thinkers 
during their life. Consider the scenario of Michael 
Crichton’s Jurassic Park, only imagine that the 
scientists are part of an extraterrestrial culture stu-
dying human DNA extracted from fossil material. 
Imagine, furthermore, that humans have disappea-
red long ago and these alien scientists have no 
clue about them, except for fragmentary remains 
of bones and technology. As humans are cloned 
and begin to function in their surroundings, would 
they behave as we do today, or would their beha-
vior be archaic? Would they acquire some language 
and speak to each other, or just stare with empty 
minds? There is even reason to question whether 
these individuals would adopt the bipedal posture at 
all, for although their bones would have the capaci-
ty to support such gait, social input may be required 
for its development. 
There is one condition that comes close to this 
fantastic scenario—that of children who, after an 
accidental separation from their parents, are lost 
in a forest and are reared by nonhuman surrogate 
parents, such as wolves or monkeys (Candland, 
1993). It is the sad, but interesting story of children 
whose biological nature is fully human but, because 
of their unusual developmental conditions, their 
nurturing did not originate in others like them. The 
most striking results are observed in cases in which 
the child was lost at a very early age and found 
years later. Such cases reveal otherwise biologica-
lly normal children who behave more in tune with 
the behavior of their adoptive parents than that of 
their own species. In some cases, these children 
show resistance to learn even some basic motor 
skills (such as using utensils and sitting at a table 
during a meal), and may learn to understand and 
use language only with great diffi culty. Most in-
terestingly, a typical observation is that they move 
around using all four limbs, just as their surrogate 
parents do. Although in some cases feral children 
learn to walk in the human fashion, this is only after 
explicit training. In other words, walking upright 
is not engraved in the human genome. Given that 
bipedalism is generally taken to be the single, most 
important novel trait distinguishing members of the 
hominid family from all other primates since the 
early Pliocene (e.g., Willoughby, 2005), the diffi -
culties of some feral children to learn to walk erect 
is particularly revealing. 
Although we do not know for sure that the Ju-
rassic Park scenario would apply to dinosaurs, as 
described in Crichton’s novel (i.e., would dinosaur 
“normal” behavior arise in their cloned relatives 
in the absence of continuity across generations?), 
we can be reasonably confi dent that, if applied to 
humans, the properties of the resulting product are 
impossible to predict—much less without knowing 
the biological and social characteristics of the alien 
species to which these humans would be exposed 
during their early development. Human nature is 
designed to respond to nurturing inputs that are 
not themselves encoded in the DNA hardware. 
Perhaps the paradigmatic example of just such a 
lock-and-key disposition is provided by Edgar R. 
Burroughs’ novel Tarzan of the Apes. 
Tarzan’s parents, the noble Lord Greystoke and 
Lady Alice, died when he was a baby, leaving him 
to be adopted by an African ape. The ape mother 
had found in this strange white infant a substitu-
te for her own, who had been brutally killed by 
the band’s leader. She protected and educated 
Tarzan against the counseling of other apes that 
saw nothing of value in this small, weak creature. 
Burroughs struggled to strike a balance between 
nature and nurture, showing Tarzan thinking like 
the ape that he was raised to be, but responding to 
some nurturing opportunities unlike any ape would 
around him. Thus, when Tarzan discovered his 
father’s books, he became intrigued by the “little 
bugs” that accompany every picture and managed 
to remain motivated for years to study them in de-
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tail. He eventually developed the ability to read, 
for the little bugs were nothing but words. Like 
an archeologist evaluating Egyptian hieroglyphs, 
Tarzan could read and write English, but had no 
idea how written words would relate to speech. 
That is, his brain responded just to the type of input 
available and it was this input that triggered his na-
tural abilities allowing them to be expressed. Just as 
the pictures and words awakened Tarzan’s human 
cognitive skills, a different type of input, a young 
American girl named Jane Porter, was in charge 
of arousing love. In an interesting passage, Tarzan 
gently places a pendant around Jane’s neck as a gift; 
surprised by this gesture, Jane kisses the pendant. 
Tarzan does not fully understand her action, but 
guesses that it must be her way of acknowledging 
the gift. Thus, Tarzan 
rose, and taking the locket in his hand, stooped gravely 
like some courtier of old, and pressed his lips upon 
it where hers had rested. It was a stately and gallant 
little compliment performed with the grace and dig-
nity of utter unconsciousness of self. It was the hall-
mark of his aristocratic birth, the natural outcropping 
of many generations of fi ne breeding, an hereditary 
instinct of graciousness which a life-time of uncouth 
and savage training and environment could not era-
dicate. […] Contact with this girl for half a day had 
left a very different Tarzan from the one on whom the 
morning’s sun had risen. Now, in every fi ber of his be-
ing, heredity spoke louder than training. (Burroughs, 
1914/2003, p. 179.)
What seems utterly obvious is how Tarzan’s 
“heredity” and “aristocratic birth” would have 
been silenced forever, had the appropriate nurtu-
ring experience of love never present itself in the 
African jungle. 
Breaking the Dichotomy
One may ask, what do the literary example of Tar-
zan and the scientifi c study of feral children bring 
to the discussion table that was not already there? 
The distinction is both subtle and important, and 
the best way to appreciate the difference is to pre-
sent it against a background provided by the two 
traditional approaches to understanding human 
nature: nativism and empiricism. I will not claim 
that the view presented here is novel; in fact, its 
ties to the epigenetic view of development are 
easily recognizable to the expert. As I will argue 
below, however, some of the elements of this epi-
genetic view can now be defi ned more clearly and 
some broader implications explored in more detail 
(e.g., the connection between views of human na-
ture and the environmental crisis).
Traditionally, human nature has been concep-
tualized in terms of two extreme positions, depen-
ding on whether heredity (nativism) or experience 
(empiricism) is considered the most fundamental 
source. When pitted against each other, this is also 
known as the nature-nurture dichotomy. Nativism 
was introduced into psychology by Francis Gal-
ton, who suggested that even the most complex 
psychological functions are inherited. Galton was 
infl uenced by the evolutionary ideas of his cousin, 
Charles Darwin, and devoted the last years of his 
life to providing support for the hypothesis that in-
heritance is a major factor in human psychology. 
To demonstrate this point, he studied psychologi-
cal traits in families, among twins, and in indivi-
duals who had been raised by adopted parents, thus 
laying the foundation of human behavior genetics. 
As a summary of his fi ndings, Galton (1883, p. 241) 
suggested that individual differences in behavior 
among people living in broadly similar environ-
ments are attributable mainly to genetic variability, 
rather than to personal experience:
There is no escape from the conclusion that nature 
prevails enormously over nurture when the differen-
ces of nurture do not exceed what is commonly to be 
found among persons of the same rank of society and 
in the same country.
In the opposite camp, John B. Watson argued 
that experience can produce not only the astonis-
hing behavioral fl exibility of complex human be-
havior, but also the stereotypical habits of everyday 
life. Watson argued that, apart from some simple 
innate refl exes, the psychological traits of an indi-
vidual are fundamentally determined by life expe-
riences. Watson’s (1924, p. 104) famous challenge 
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is a paradigm of his empiricist view of human 
nature: 
Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and 
my own specifi ed world to bring them up in and I’ll 
guarantee to take any one at random and train him to 
become any type of specialist I might select—doctor, 
lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even beggar-
man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, 
tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his an-
cestors.
Despite their extremism, both Galton and Wat-
son avoid a strong version of their respective po-
sitions. A strong version of Galton’s view would 
demand no concessions to experience; but for 
heredity to work its way into the psychological 
profi le of adult individuals, the conditions of nur-
ture must not be unusual, as Galton pointed out in 
the previous citation. Similarly, a strong empiri-
cist view would demand a mental tabula rasa; yet, 
Watson requests healthy and well-formed infants 
to fulfi ll his challenge, as if these provided some 
critical mental precursors. Because these extremes 
cannot work in isolation, compromising positions 
have gained always a certain degree of popularity, 
even if they fail to attract the public for their lacking 
of fl amboyance and closer adherence to reality. 
Somehow, Jurassic Park would not be as specta-
cular if the velociraptors were unable to “sponta-
neously” connect with their predatory nature and 
know exactly how to group-hunt their prey with 
amazing sophistication.
It would seem obvious that both nativism 
and empiricism must bear some proportion of 
the truth. On the nativist side, it is hardly surpri-
sing that one usually gets a human baby out of the 
mating of two human parents—not a chimpan-
zee, not a horned frog, not a sage plant. The same 
degree of specifi city applies, of course, to every 
other sexually reproducing species. Thus, genetic 
information must be setting the boundaries of the 
developmental process, outside of which no viable 
outcome is possible. On the empiricist side, unless 
one believes that there is a little heart, or brain, or 
metabolic process, or behavior, or idea embedded 
in the DNA molecule (as a preformationist view of 
development would suggest), it is a patent truth that 
genes only code for the building of proteins. Thus, 
something other than merely genes is required to 
go from a fertilized egg to a mature organism, and 
that “something” must necessarily come from 
outside of the genome. However, simply recog-
nizing that there is a bit of truth in nativism and 
in empiricism does not automatically yield the 
epigenetic view. 
Strictly speaking, epigenesis refers to the deve-
lopment of structural and functional differentiation 
from a relatively less differentiated previous sta-
ge. Beginning with a fertilized egg, multiple cells 
are created, they differentiate into various types, 
these form tissues, which, in turn, give raise to 
organs, and a complete organism. Because none 
of the outcomes resembles the components of the 
previous stage (e.g., differentiated cells have pro-
perties not contained in their precursors), they are 
described as “emergent properties” of the develo-
ping organism and assumed to be able to infl uence 
the emergence of components of the next level of 
organization. Epigenesis, then, views developmen-
tal outcomes as the result of complex interactions 
at all levels of organismic structure and function. 
Moltz (1965, p. 44) provided a clear defi nition: 
An epigenetic approach holds that all response sys-
tems are synthesized during ontogeny and that this 
synthesis involves the integrative infl uence of both 
intraorganic processes and extrinsic stimulative con-
ditions. It considers gene effects to be contingent on 
environmental conditions and regards the genotype 
as capable of entering into different classes of rela-
tionships depending on the prevailing environmental 
context. In the epigeneticist’s view, the environment 
is not benignly supportive, but actively implicated in 
determining the very structure and organization of 
each response system.
A key aspect of this characterization of epige-
nesis is the emphasis placed on interactions. But it 
may be misleading to think that only the external 
environment (external with respect to the organism) 
is the one interacting with genetic information. As 
Lehrman (1953, p. 345) put it: 
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At any stage of development, the new features emerge 
from the interaction within the current state and bet-
ween the current stage and the environment.
Interactions “within the current state” refer to 
infl uences occurring within a given level of orga-
nization, such as is the case, for example, when 
transcription of a structural gene is initiated by a 
protein produced by a regulatory gene (i.e., gene-
gene interaction). Gottlieb (1992) referred to such 
interactions as horizontal coactions, that is, the 
infl uences that occur among elements at the same 
biological level (perhaps the most notorious ins-
tance of horizontal coaction is that which occurs 
among neurons in the central nervous system). Im-
portantly, there are also vertical coactions, that is, 
processes occurring at one level may infl uence the 
development of the system at other levels. A fasci-
nating example of a vertical coaction is the effect 
of early experience on the development of cortical 
neurons (Greenough, 1987). Infant rats exposed to 
a complex environment exhibit a larger number of 
synaptic sites (i.e., sites where information fl ows 
from one neuron to another). Early stimulation al-
so leads to more effi cient performance in a variety 
of learning tasks. Similarly, the formation of a sta-
ble, long-term memory through training and expe-
rience (organism-environment interaction) requires 
changes in neural networks in the brain (neuron-
neuron interactions and neuron-behavior interac-
tions), which, in turn, require gene transcription 
(neuron-DNA interaction) that modifi es the trans-
mission of neural potentials at malleable or plastic 
synapses (Nguyen et al., 1995; Stork et al., 2001). 
It is such long-term memories that probably under-
lie the development of the very beliefs of nativists, 
empiricists, epigeneticists, and any others who have 
thought about these issues. Such vertical coactions 
have important consequences understanding the 
relationship between nature and nurture, which can 
no longer be viewed through the Galtonian glass of 
a dichotomy. Clearly, fundamental components 
of nurture (such as the acquisition of long-term 
memories) require the intervention of fundamental 
components of nature (such as gene expression), 
or, put in different terms, nature is “prepared” to 
take care of nurture. In epigenetic terms it makes 
perfect sense to refer to the “genetics of learning” 
or to “experience-activated genes” as nature and 
nurture are no longer viewed as opposites. Vertical 
coactions are at the heart of Gottlieb’s (1992, pp. 
159-160) concept of probabilistic epigenesis:
Individual development is characterized by an increase 
of complexity of organization—i.e., the emergen-
ce of new structural and functional properties and 
competencies—at all levels of analysis (molecular, 
subcellular, cellular, organismic) as a consequence of 
horizontal and vertical coactions.
The qualifi er “probabilistic” implies that coac-
tions make it impossible to conceptualize develop-
ment as a simple serial process whereby one stage 
invariably leads to the next. In contrast, because 
properties emerge as a result of inputs that can vary 
dramatically across individuals, there is a substan-
tial degree of unpredictability about the fi nal out 
come of development, even within the boundaries 
set by genetic information. So, for example, it is 
unlikely that any set of inputs could be devised that 
would result in the development of a human being 
out of a fertilized frog or mouse egg. Nonetheless, 
a look at human diversity around the world—both 
physical and cultural—shows an impressive degree 
of plasticity (Lewontin, 1982). Phenotypic plasti-
city, defi ned as an organism’s ability to adjust to 
environmental pressures in terms of morphology 
or function, is not only a human characteristic, but 
also a general feature of the animal and plant worlds 
(West-Eberhard, 2003). 
Whether one believes that nature and nurture 
are dichotomous entities, as pure nativist and em-
piricist views suggest, or the extremes of a single 
dimension, as suggested by probabilistic epige-
nesis, the view correlates with one’s particular 
ethical stance. Although the relationship between 
a person’s view of the nature-nurture issue and the 
facts considered relevant to that view’s evaluation 
is suspiciously similar to the egg-and-chicken pa-
radox, we can certainly point to some signifi cant, 
broad correlations. For example, working closer to 
a nativist viewpoint, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) 
concluded that the proportion of human intelligence 
that depends on genetic factors was large enough 
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to explain such social problems as unemployment, 
homelessness, and school dropout. An implication 
they pursued—and one that generated substantial 
controversy (see Jacoby & Glauberman, 1995)—
indicated that government spending on social pro-
grams aimed at solving some of these problems 
was doomed to fail, precisely because of the pre-
sumed lack of plasticity of genetically determined 
characters, such as—they presumed—human inte-
lligence. On the other extreme, an empiricist view 
may suggest that such human traits as selfi shness, a 
religious drive, or criminal behavior are simple re-
sults of social experience. Communist governments 
appear to have acted on the belief that, for example, 
a generation educated under the principle of social 
altruism (e.g., individuals working for the benefi t 
of the community) would eliminate self-centered 
individualism. The corruption that ensued in such 
countries as the Soviet Union, at all levels of go-
vernment, is a clear indication that selfi shness is 
not a simple product of the capitalist system, but a 
rooted aspect of human nature. 
Just as nativist and empiricist viewpoints are 
consistent with socially relevant ideas, so is the case 
with epigenesis. Consider the relationship between 
nutrition and brain development. Few would doubt 
that the type and quality of nutrients a person con-
sumes would affect that person’s brain physiology. 
An epigenetic approach, however, warns about the 
possibility that nutrition may play an organizing ro-
le during brain development and, more importantly, 
that these effects are likely to be more dramatic 
as a function of whether the appropriate nutrients 
acted on brain development during a sensitive 
period in early infancy. Sensitive periods refl ect a 
unique point during development when a system 
is ready to produce some emergent property. This is 
consistent with data on the effects of malnutrition 
on both experimental animal models (Bedi, 2003), 
and human populations (Lukas & Campbell, 2000). 
In other words, the effects of a nurturing factor on 
brain development depend on a complex interaction 
with internal constraints such as the presence of a 
limited window of opportunity for action. 
Many serious implications stem from this fact, 
including some related to the social consequences 
of widespread malnutrition. When large numbers 
of people are subjected to defi cient nutrition, as it 
is the case in some developing countries, the psy-
chological and neurological sequelae become one 
of the most important obstacles for socioeconomic 
progress. A nation populated by a critical mass of 
adults who lacked exposure to an adequate diet as 
infants may face such a low psychological ceiling 
that many reforms are simply impossible to im-
plement for lack of human resources. Given pre-
sent-day technology, the situation could be easily 
solved in terms of food supply; but a resolution of 
this problem requires a kind of long-term political 
commitment that seems to be diffi cult to envision, 
even for well-nurtured leaders. 
Us vs. Them
All conceptions of human nature have an ethical 
dimension. Individuals imbued in nativism, empi-
ricism, or epigenesis will, as a result of their views, 
fi nd comfort in certain social events, support certain 
forms of social change, and fi ght against ideals that 
they consider false, unjust, or dangerous. These 
views of human nature are not passive adornments 
of the mind, but actively shape a person’s beliefs 
about how human beings should relate to each other 
both within and across cultures. Most importantly, 
perhaps, while the human brain exhibits neural 
plasticity throughout a person’s lifetime, such plas-
ticity is mainly concerned with the acquisition of 
information about specifi c events: who did what 
and when. In contrast, there seems to be much less 
plasticity devoted to changing attitudes, beliefs, and 
even motor habits. Psychologists coined different 
labels to these types of memory: representational 
(for events and episodes) and dispositional (for 
beliefs and habits; Squire, 1987), and it seems 
reasonable to extend these labels to the brain and 
think in terms of representational and dispositional 
plasticity. Beliefs crystallize during early develop-
ment and also, possibly, after exposure to extreme 
circumstances that may induce dispositional plas-
ticity (e.g., imprisonment, family tragedy, sudden 
wealth). Once crystallized, the resulting brain net-
works are diffi cult to modify. Incoming information 
is therefore forced to accommodate to preexisting 
frames of reference, or, if this is not possible, the 
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information is simply ignored or dismissed as an 
exception. This provides stability to a person’s 
behavior, even if such stability is achieved at the 
expense of the objective assessment of reality and 
self-scrutiny. This characterization implies, the-
refore, two stages. First, an early developmental 
stage (or an adult stage under special circumstan-
ces) characterized by dispositional brain plastici-
ty during which nature-nurture views crystallize 
and, second, an adult stage characterized by the 
relative absence of dispositional changes during 
which nature-nurture beliefs can affect a person’s 
interpretation of social events and act as causes of 
cultural change or stasis. 
Self-inclusion in a social group and the evalua-
tion of other groups are processes guided by parti-
cular nature-nurture beliefs. I resort again to Tarzan 
of the Apes (Burroughs, 1914/2003) for an extreme 
case that illustrates this point. Tarzan found it natu-
ral to include himself among the apes with which he 
was raised. As such, he had no option but to fi ght for 
leadership according to the rules of the ape group. 
Only contact with the human archetypes provided 
by his father’s books slowly instigated the notion 
that he was different. He sought for affi nity no lon-
ger among the apes, but elsewhere, leaving the lea-
dership of the ape group to search for his own place 
in the world. In other words, Tarzan’s initial “ape 
nature” allowed for choices that his new “human 
nature” precluded (e.g., leadership of the ape group 
and interest for the “little bugs,” respectively). As 
Burroughs showed in his novel, Tarzan could never 
quite escape from being a sort of “hybrid,” an outco-
me that, in fact, nicely fi ts his epigenetic disposition 
to integrate nurture into nature. 
In shifting from an ape to a human nature view, 
Tarzan’s social beliefs of belongingness were 
shaken to their core. Such a crisis also shows the 
extent to which his life was guided by acceptance 
of an “us” world and rejection of a “them” world. 
Ape nature gradually became less a part of “us” and 
more a part of “them.” But Tarzan is a very unusual 
character. Regular human beings generally live 
their entire lives as part of the same social group; 
only a minority experiences something analogous 
to Tarzan’s worldview shift (e.g., immigrants, ins-
tant celebrities, and bankrupts, among others). As a 
result of the stability of life styles, it is possible for 
most people to partition the human world into those 
who are like them versus everybody else. Most, if 
not all, of human history appears to have been do-
minated by this “us-versus-them” view, which so-
cial psychologists refer to as the ingroup-outgroup 
tension. Lewin (1948) fi rst pointed out that groups 
are formed when an aggregate of individuals fi nds 
a common fate and a common task. Such interde-
pendence transforms a collection of people into a 
cohesive group capable of a type of coordinated ac-
tivity that would not result from individual actions 
alone. For example, people traveling in an airplane 
would hardly constitute a group; but a threat posed 
by hijackers can transform the aggregate in a group 
of hostages with a common interest and facilitate 
the development of strong bonds of cohesion (Ja-
cobson, 1973). 
The potential adaptive signifi cance of such an 
ingroup bias based on interdependence can hard-
ly be overemphasized, particularly in regards to 
sparsely distributed groups of early hominins in 
the African savanna. This is, after all, the com-
mon pattern for many social species. Spotted hye-
nas, for example, use clan odors to mark a wide 
territory and exclude conspecifi cs from outside 
the clan (Kruuk, 1972). In rodents, attacked intru-
ders rapidly learn to fear the smell of colony odors 
(Williams, Worland, & Smith, 1990). A sort of 
basic ethics derives from this biological fact, one 
that could be summarized in the proposition “ac-
cept those carrying the ingroup signal and reject 
anybody else.” It seems thus plausible that ethical 
principles, as known to philosophers, theologians, 
and laypersons, ultimately derived from this basic 
biological fact, as traits that promote social be-
havior passed on across generations from remote 
ancestors. Sociality evolved many times indepen-
dently in the animal kingdom (e.g., in primates and 
hymenopteran insects) and studies demonstrate that 
many factors correlate with the presence of rela-
tively complex forms of grouping, including the 
distribution of food resources, strategies for food 
procurement, predatory pressures, and breeding 
opportunities (for a review, see Papini, in press). 
Undoubtedly, some of these pressures have con-
tributed to the evolution of human sociality by a 
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conventional process of natural selection acting at 
the individual level. Additionally, Wilson (1987) 
has argued that a process of group selection may 
also have contributed signifi cantly to the evolution 
of social traits, including altruistic behavior. Group 
competition similar to that seen among human 
societies occurs in chimpanzees, the species with 
the closest common ancestor to humans, as far as 
fossil and DNA evidence suggest. Chimpanzees 
exhibit a great deal of hostility toward members of 
other groups, engaging in take-over tactics, infan-
ticide, and even a sort of warfare activity that can 
result in killing among adult males (Goodall, 1986). 
There is no question that similar, although more so-
phisticated, behavior is present in modern humans, 
as described in any world history textbook, and it 
seems plausible that violent behavior sprouting 
from an us-versus-them worldview has been the 
rule during much of primate evolution. 
According to the epigenetic view, the type of 
social cognitive skills described by psychologists 
should originate from a set of complex interactions 
between genetic and cultural infl uences acting upon 
individual human beings. Whatever their origin, 
these social-cognitive biases are patently responsi-
ble for social confl icts of large proportions. At this 
point, moreover, it is a self-evident truth that the 
us-versus-them worldview is not only a propensity 
of human development, but also a purposely im-
plemented tactic of domination of one group over 
another. Practically every war, whether ancient or 
modern, is associated with the dehumanization and 
abuse of the enemy. During the past few centuries, 
the same western societies that developed the ideals 
of freedom and human rights were also responsible 
for slavery, apartheid, colonialism, and the support 
of countless dictatorships in developing countries. 
What are the cultural pressures that promote 
the us-versus-them tension? Eidelson and Eidel-
son (2003) identifi ed fi ve group-level beliefs that 
contribute to social confl icts: superiority, injustice, 
vulnerability, distrust, and helplessness. When such 
beliefs spread on a substantial number of indivi-
duals within a society, they promote confl ict with 
other similar societies. Consider superiority as an 
example, that is, the view according to which “we” 
are morally superior, chosen, and entitled, whereas 
“they” are inferior, contemptible, and immoral. One 
major drawback of a culture affl icted by a superiori-
ty belief is its inability to compromise and apologi-
ze, both of which are needed for a lasting resolution 
of confl icts. Group-level beliefs can be conceptua-
lized as yet another emergent level of epigenetic 
organization, linking individuals (who still are 
required to hold and express a particular view for 
it to become a group-level belief), to their culture. 
Cultural pressures affecting the developing child, 
adolescent, and young adult could be particular im-
portant in shaping beliefs that will infl uence adult 
behavior. Such pressures are instrumented through 
family interactions, school, religious institutions, 
government and local authorities, law-enforcement 
agents, role models, mass media, and, perhaps most 
importantly, what peers think, like, and do. 
When a person passionately wants to change 
the world, the means available may range from in-
volvement in community activities, to politics and 
military careers, depending on the culture in which 
the person is embedded. Despite our ignorance 
about the fundamental causes that shape the belie-
fs of regular people, those who shape group-level 
beliefs, including politicians, educators, soldiers, 
artists, and entertainers, may sometimes have a 
surprisingly high level of effectiveness. This is be-
cause while social processes are complex, people 
can still sometimes infl uence them. This is obviou
sly not true for every individual who would like to 
exercise some control over his or her own social en-
vironment, but only for some selected set of people. 
But the point is still a valid one: Human beings 
have a great deal of experience on how to infl uen-
ce social processes, they have some knowledge of 
basic factors, and they know that social change of 
large magnitude can sometimes be unleashed in 
relatively short periods of time. 
Over the past several centuries, a growing frac-
tion of the world’s nations has also experienced an 
impressive degree of technological change. Social 
changes (e.g., the spread of democracy) and the im-
pressive cognitive abilities of human beings (e.g., 
the industrial revolution) have led to the emergence 
of a new factor: the environmental crisis. It would 
seem natural for a culture based on the us-versus-
them worldview to substitute “environment” for 
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“them” and to continue operating under the same 
basic assumption, namely, that the “us” is detached 
from the “them” and fundamentally independent. 
But in so doing, the us-versus-them worldview has 
been extended to a domain regulated by principles 
far more powerful than any politician or general 
can imagine or hope to control on a short-term 
basis with campaigns, fund raising, or military 
interventions.
Wishful Thinking
Nature-nurture views are not purely theoretical is-
sues. However a person conceptualizes his or her 
place in society has practical implications not just 
for social views, but also for the larger problem of 
the place of humans in nature. If the products of hu-
man activity are viewed from an evolutionary pers-
pective, there can be little doubt as to the amazing 
achievements of our species. There is no other li-
ving creature, as far as is known, that has generated 
a multiplicity of schemes for government, judicial 
systems, technology, forms of entertainment, art, 
libraries, and scientifi c research, among so many 
other achievements. Even an updated knowledge 
of animal behavior shows that nothing of this sort 
exists outside of human societies. Other species 
show precursors of many of these products and 
perhaps it would be unfair at this point to discard 
the parsimonious assumption that the differences 
are only of degree, not kind. But the degree of so-
phistication characterizing human behavior, both 
individual and social, is just unparalleled in nature. 
In addition, urban life has effectively broken daily 
contact with natural forces. For most city-dwelling 
people, “antipredator defense” is more related to 
traffi c than to large carnivores, and “foraging for 
food” refers to grocery shopping rather than to 
hunting-gathering activities. As a result, it is not 
that surprising that many fi nd it diffi cult to see 
themselves (and the entire human species) as part 
of the intricate system of nature. 
However sophisticated humans may have be-
come in their recent cultural evolution, everything 
they do ultimately requires natural resources. But 
nature is so large and its forces so powerful, that 
societies have been operating under the assump-
tion that the natural processes will take care of the 
byproducts of human activity. So, for example, 
house trash is dumped in special fi elds, industrial 
waste into the waters of rivers and oceans, and 
automobile exhaust gases into the atmosphere. So-
mehow, most people expect that the land, water, and 
air would take care of these byproducts of human 
activity without losing their quality. To some extent 
and within certain limits, such waste can be natu-
rally recycled without affecting the environment. 
However, there is an increasing amount of substan-
ces that are stressing the environment to a point that 
many scientists consider dangerously close to a se-
rious breakdown of major world ecosystems. This 
is not a new phenomenon, something unique to 
contemporary industrialized societies, but appears 
to be a constant of human cultures. The difference 
between the current environmental situation and 
others that have been documented in the past is the 
scale: The entire planet is now under threat. Consi-
der the example of the Polynesian culture of Easter 
Island (Hunt, 2007). 
Easter Island (with a surface of about 116 squa-
re kilometers) is located in the south Pacifi c, some 
3,600 kilometers away from any other land. It is 
thought that the fi rst inhabitants arrived in the is-
land about 2000 years ago, from the west, bringing 
their culture as well as Pacifi c rats (Rattus exulans) 
in their canoes. The main remnants of the Polyne-
sian culture that fl ourished until the 17th century 
are giant stone monuments, called moai, that have 
attracted considerable attention because of their 
size and number. The mystery of these monuments 
lies in the fact that, in its current barren state, the 
island could not sustain the life of a population ca-
pable of building the moai. Studies show, however, 
that the island was covered with forests when the 
fi rst inhabitants arrived and their culture developed 
on the basis of the resources provided by them. 
Deforestation may have been the result of human 
overexploitation or of the effect of the Pacifi c rat 
(Rattus exulans) on the seeds of giant palms and 
other trees endemic to the island. Whether Pacifi c 
rats were introduced on purpose or accidentally by 
the early colonizers of Easter Island, their effect 
appears to have been catastrophic. Extensive de-
forestation beyond the environment’s capacity to 
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replenish trees led to instability in water supply and 
land erosion. Violence may have been the result of 
an increasing shortage of resources and, in turn, 
contributed to the further breakdown of the island’s 
economy leading, eventually, to a complete cultural 
disintegration. The culture came to an end around 
1680, when warfare between two factions resulted in 
the virtual extermination of one of them, the collap-
se of economic activities, and widespread disease. 
Europeans arrived in the 18th century carrying new 
diseases (like small pox) and slavery, and introdu-
ced a number of exotic species, including sheep 
and rats (Rattus norvegicus), all of which resulted 
in further decimation of the population and the en-
vironment. By 1900, the population reached a low 
of 111 people. The case of Easter Island highlights 
the interplay of ecological and cultural factors in the 
demographic collapse of an entire society, thus pro-
viding a plausible scenario in a small scale of what 
may be happening with contemporary industrial 
societies on a planetary scale. 
Economic growth can be sustained only up to a 
point. When the resulting waste byproducts and the 
depletion of natural resources stress ecosystems be-
yond their ability to remain stable, growth (either in 
economic terms or in population terms) is no longer 
possible. The maximum population that an ecosys-
tem can support without degradation is referred to as 
the system’s carrying capacity. The main point of the 
Easter Island case is that economic systems can grow 
beyond their carrying capacity for a limited amount 
of time; eventually, however, the system may collap-
se to a point of no recovery. Of course, the question of 
interest is whether contemporary economic growth is 
below or above the carrying capacity of the planetary 
ecosystem. There are signals suggesting that the eco-
logical stress caused by human activity is reaching 
or has already surpassed the earth carrying capacity. 
Some such signals include air, water, and land pollu-
tion (e.g., high marine levels of mercury and heavy 
metals), a drop in biodiversity (e.g., extinction of rain 
forest species caused by deforestation), atmospheric 
changes (e.g., ozone depletion), overexploitation of 
natural populations (e.g., overfi shing), and global 
warming (e.g., caused by carbon dioxide, methane, 
and other greenhouse gases that disrupt heat dissi-
pation in the atmosphere). 
A resolution of the environmental crisis will re-
quire more than just political determination, sound 
economic decisions, and reliable scientifi c informa-
tion. The process can only produce timely results if 
a critical mass of citizens, including political and 
corporate leaders, embraces the idea that human 
cultures and the ecological systems that sustain 
them are in a fundamentally trophic relationship 
that can be disrupted or perturbed only at the cost 
of extreme consequences for both. A new consensus 
on the value of environmentalism is emerging (e.g., 
Belshaw, 2001), but the political decisions seem 
to be lagging behind, as they are vulnerable to the 
lobbying capacity of corporate leaders who con-
tinue to operate on a wishful-thinking mode. The 
us-versus-them principle appears to be exhausted 
by the very success that it generated. But, are these 
signs of environmental crisis suffi cient to induce 
corrective measures? 
Conclusions
If the rules of human behavior underlying the 
current environmental crisis are viewed as part of 
human nature, then the ability to device correc-
tive measures based on experience would refl ect 
human nurture capacities. If human behavior is 
naturally guided by such rules as “treat nature as 
a them”, “assume the renewability of natural re-
sources”, “pursue immediate gratifi cation”, and 
so on, then the effects generated by such rules 
(e.g., water contamination, global warming, cli-
mate change) are the experiential factors that feed 
human nurture. Thus, drawing a parallel between 
the individual level of human behavior and the 
socio-political level of social change, one may 
ask: What type of experiential factors would in-
duce the needed corrective measures? 
In the fi lm Groundhog Day (1993, directed by 
Harold Ramis, written by Danny Rubin), the main 
character undergoes a deep change of personality, 
as a mysterious power forces him to live the same 
day hundreds of times. This is a man who despises 
his job, treats coworkers with an air of superiority, 
looks at women as sexual objects, and displays his 
sarcastic view of affairs with pride. This is an arro-
gant, pompous, and egotistical man. Above all, he 
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loathes Punxsutawney, a little town in Pennsylva-
nia where people gather every February 2nd to look 
at a woodchuck named Punxsutawney Phil that, 
according to tradition, predicts whether the winter 
will last for an additional six weeks. As a basically 
selfi sh and manipulative person, he soon realizes 
that he can use this strange turn of events to take 
advantage of people. Thus, he proceeds to steal 
money and to convince a beautiful, trusting woman 
that they know each other from high school so as 
to take advantage of her. Eventually, he takes over 
the task of seducing his coworker by memorizing 
her favorite drink, poetry, ice cream, and a number 
of other details so as to, again, take advantage of 
her. But he fails miserably. In desperation, he even 
tries suicide only to learn that everything starts back 
at 6:00 a.m., the next morning. As his hypocritical 
disposition brings no change to his situation, he 
develops a deeper sense about what is important 
in life. Out of this process emerges an altruist man, 
one who provides help to others at no personal gain, 
worries about his coworkers, learns the pleasure of 
performing the piano, struggles unsuccessfully to 
save a homeless man from passing away, and be-
comes genuinely poetic. Furthermore, in trying to 
make his mark without ulterior motives, he fi nally 
gains the love of the same woman who has persis-
tently rejected his advances when they were faked 
and insincere. 
When evaluating the implications of this story, 
one cannot help but conclude that a change of cha-
racter really requires a fantastic set of circumstan-
ces. In the fi lm, this fantastic component is the fact 
that this man is trapped in time, forced to go through 
this particular day of his life whatever number of 
times is required until he changes from the inside. 
In real life, similarly extraordinary circumstances 
may be required to induce the sort of dispositional 
plasticity required to change a person’s character. 
But crystallization may be a property displayed 
by any stable system. For example, economic and 
social systems also have rules that remain stable 
while change occurs at a more superfi cial level. 
Once the system is in place, it would tend to re-
main stable until a crisis of suffi cient proportion 
disrupts it. Without the conditions afforded by a 
“fantastic” set of circumstances, social systems 
may also lack something akin to dispositional plas-
ticity. Thus, when posing the question “are these 
signs of environmental crisis suffi cient to induce 
corrective measures?” the answer would have to 
be something along the lines of “hopefully yes, 
but probably not.” Extraordinary circumstances 
may be needed to reintroduce “dispositional cul-
tural plasticity,” so that it can undergo the changes 
that are required to correct the problem. In the 
case of the current environmental crisis, perhaps 
nothing major will be done by the socio-political 
establishment of industrialized societies until an 
episode of transcendental consequences ensues, 
with devastating effects in terms of human lives 
and long-term environmental damage. It took se-
veral thousand deaths on September 11, 2001, to 
mobilize the United States against terrorism. The 
alarming possibility is that an environmental degra-
dation that never produces a catastrophic event, but 
emerges gradually, may delay corrective measures 
until it is too late to avoid long-term environmental 
damage, as it may have occurred in Easter Island—
except that moving to another “island” is not viable 
in this case.
Just as there are reasons to be concerned with 
the current environmental situation, there are also 
reasons to be moderately optimistic about the hu-
man capacity to respond to social confl icts. A recent 
example is provided by the threat of nuclear war 
during the Cold War era, which, despite all indi-
cations (or, perhaps, because of them), fortunately 
never materialized. Groups can be brought together 
by the emergence of a superordinate goal—a com-
mon problem. Clearly, the current environmental 
crisis constitutes an example of an event that affects 
everybody and solving it could easily become a su-
perordinate goal. Like the bull and the bear at the 
arena, all human beings are tied by the prospect of 
a worldwide environmental collapse, which has 
come to play a role much like that of mortality’s in 
Seneca’s opening plea. Thus, hope lies in the pos-
sibility that the amassed experience of the last few 
centuries can nurture human natural capacities with 
ideals of respect for, and protection of each other 
and of the environment, so as to avoid the environ-
mental degradation and the collapse of civilization 
that would almost certainly follow. 
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